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3 May 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 18/79)

NEAR
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AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

JAPANESE AID--Japan will extend a grant aid of 65,022,000 yen (\$325,000) to Afghanistan under notes exchanged in Kabul Sunday, the Foreign Ministry announced Monday. The money to be donated will finance purchases of products necessary for economic development and the improvement of the people's welfare in Afghanistan. The ministry said that the grant is in line with a resolution adopted by the UNCTAD in March last year, which urged developed countries to take steps to soften terms and conditions of their official development aid to developing countries. [Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 10 Apr 79 p 4 OW]

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ALGERIA

HALF OF LNG SALES TO BE HANDLED BY ALGERIAN FLEET

London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Mar 79 p 108

[Text]

After a long and costly lay-up in the Norwegian fjords, the first of the Algerian National Shipping Company (CNAN) fleet of giant liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) tankers started plying the north Atlantic at the end of last year. This was the start of regular crossings which will take large quantities of Algerian LNG to the US market over the next 20 years.

The 125,000 cu.m *Ben Boulaid* has been leased for a year to El Paso of the US, but after this period it should enter into regular service for CNAN.

Delays in implementing Algeria's ambitious LNG development programme, caused by technical difficulties, obliged both this tanker and the 129,000 cu.m *Ben M'Hidi* to lie idle for over a year. Now, however, CNAN's Managing Director, Muhammad Guendouz, believes that these problems have been solved and the expansion of the company's tanker fleet can go ahead.

LNG transport is the focal point of Algeria's bid to handle more of its hydrocarbon exports under its own flag. CNAN intends, for example, to handle 50% of LNG sales and a clause to this effect is written into all

CNAN already handles half its trade with France but only 25-30% of trade with Italy and Spain

LNG contracts signed between Sonatrach and foreign firms.

CNAN already owns three gas tankers and will be receiving another three by 1980. Company officials expect to buy about 10 more of these \$130mn LNG tankers in coming years. Tenders may also be invited for a dozen or so LPG tankers of 40,000cu m.

It is mainly the expansion of CNAN's LNG shipping capacity which will make the Algerian fleet one of the biggest in terms of tonnage in the Arab world and Africa, with the exception of those flying flags of convenience. By the beginning of this year the fleet numbered 70 ships boasting an average age of under five years.

According to company officials, however, CNAN still has a long way to go to reach the 50% target figure. Last year it was able to ship only 25% of Algeria's overseas trade. Of this 13-15% was carried in CNAN-owned vessels and the rest in 70 time-chartered ships.

CNAN's activities are not limited to hydrocarbon and general merchandise transport.

The company also runs passenger services between Algeria and European ports and its five car ferries and two time-chartered ferries carried over 300,000 people and about 80,000 vehicles in 1978.

CNAN's crews number over 2,500, many of them trained at Algeria's own National Institute of Shipping, and 10 of the company's ships are now entrusted to Algerian staff officers. Many officers have still to be appointed from abroad, however, and the real shortage of the trained Algerians will not be overcome until 1985-86.

To achieve this level of development the company has had to rely heavily on international funds. At the moment it is striving to obtain longer maturities of 20-25 years for its loans and is generally seeking more favourable terms. In recent talks CNAN officials have made no secret to Algeria's customers of the fact that unless credit terms are improved they will be obliged to calculate this added cost in the price of LNG.

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ALGERIA

BRIEFS

NIPPON STEEL AGREEMENT--The Algerian state-owned steel company, Societe Nationale de Siderurgie (SNS) has appointed Nippon Steel of Japan to provide design and consultancy services worth \$19mm over the next three years, under the terms of a 10-year technical assistance agreement. Nippon Steel will be assisting in the preparations for a steel complex to be built at La Macta. [Text] [London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Mar 79 p 114]

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IRAN

IRAN BETWEEN CHAOS AND BARBARISM

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Mar 79 p 69

[Text] One month after the revolution which overthrew the Shah's regime, Iran finds itself paralyzed industrially. The administration which Mehdi Bazargan's progressive government is trying to set up has become a den of conspirators. The army has dissolved as if by magic. By night Tehran is a city where anonymous shots are traded.

On his arrival at his retreat in the sacred city of Qom, the Ayatollah Khomeyni, still independent of the situation, was received tumultuously by 300,000 faithful. In his first public address in the city where Khomeyni has his religious fief, the all-powerful Ayatollah criticized the Bazargan government for its excessive weakness and its inability to carry out the reestablishment of the Islamic laws.

However, in reality it was not weakness, but in any case powerlessness. According to rumors, Bazargan has tried to submit his resignation three times in the last month. Every time, Khomeyni has refused to listen to the protests of the prime minister whom he appointed of his own will. Bazargan has demanded that Khomeyni dissolve the Khomeynist committees which are currently operating in Iran as an uncontrolled parallel government.

Bazargan is willing to govern because he knows that right now his is the only man with majority support among the progressive population of Iran. This is a fact that even Khomeyni himself realizes and weighs, and he has not hesitated to contradict himself since his first speech in Qom to declare once again his unconditional support of the provisional government.

However, Bazargan demands the rebuilding of the army, the disarmament of the Khomeynist and Marxist Muslim guerrillas--mojahedeen and fedayeen--, the unification of the judicial power and the immediate cessation of the secret trials where extremely summary justice is meted out in the name of the laws of the Koran. More than 50 extremely summary executions have been carried out in the last 4 weeks. There have been over 2,000 deaths in street conflicts among rival factions, not just in Tehran but in cities in the provinces. There is total disorder.

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A perfect symptom of the chaos were the demonstrations by tens of thousands of women who protested for 4 hours in the streets of Tehran during the second weekend in March. The women, dressed "provocatively" in western style, protested against one of the latest Islamic edicts which reinstated the obligatory use of the chador—a veil covering from nose to ankle—for female public officials.

And from one chaos to another: The women also demanded the repeal of another Islamic edict which abolished one of the laws promulgated by the Shah by which the women could file for divorce. Islamic brigades attacked the women with knives in the streets of Tehran. A last minute intercession by Bazargan forced Khomeyni to publish a communique forbidding the ill treatment of women demonstrators.

Khomeyni has begun to show signs of vacillating. All the western fears about a possible return to medieval obscurantism seem, nevertheless, to be coming true. The autonomous Khomeyni committees are organizing public whippings of adulterers, drunks and thieves.

Among the over half a hundred mortal victims of the new Islamic Inquisition are five homosexuals and five rapists or corruptors of minors. The executions of officials or former police agents are reported to Bazargan's powerless government when they are already a fait accompli. Khomeyni—isolated by his praetorian guard, his self-importance fanned by his victory—thinks only about the arrival of 30 March, when a referendum will be held in which every Iranian over 16 years of age will be able to vote in favor of or against the legal constitution of an Islamic republic. Those voting in favor will cast a green ballot; those against, a red one signed with their name and address.

The idea of a referendum as a solution seems absurd not just to Bazargan himself. Two ayatollahs, the liberal Shariatmadari and the pro-socialist Taleghani, immediately went over to the opposition. The "secular" Iranian forces have divided up radically. The westernists, with Bazargan as their main patron, seek an immediate reestablishment of order, the effective rebuilding of the army and a decided return to work so that the oil exports reach their former level of 7 million barrels a day.

The leftist guerrillas—armed since before the beginning of the revolution—are in favor of the creation of a people's army, the workers committees controlling the factories and businesses, and Khomeyni's ceasing to return to the old traditions of the Koran.

If forced to come to an agreement, the guerrillas want to join the Bazargan government, a desire rejected out of hand by Khomeyni, who recently declared that there is nothing written in the Islamic creed against private enterprise.

The western countries, now forced to negotiate Iranian petroleum concessions separately, are in favor of a solution for order. Their hopes rest with a

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takeover by the air force, the only military branch which supported Khomeyni from the beginning and whose officers have not been decapitated in the majority by the revolution.

The 30 March referendum seems devoid of meaning in a country with more than 90 percent shiaa faithful. Everything seems to portend a final solution by force. But who has the power to start it in a country where the power is all in pieces?

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IRAQ

HUSAYN STRIVES FOR STABILITY IN AREA, STRESSES ARAB SOVEREIGNTY

London THE GUARDIAN in English 11 Apr 79 p 8 LD

[Report from Beirut by David Hirst: "Iraq Is Sitting on the Fence"]

[Text] Iraq's "strongman," Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti, has warned that his country would never allow Saudi Arabia to be occupied by the Soviet Union. There could be hardly a more startling example of the topsy-turvy condition of the Arab world today--with Iraq as the purest expression of it.

Iraq, ostensibly one of the most radical Arab states, has put forward the view that the Soviet Union is as likely an aggressor as the United States, at a time when two pro-Western "moderates," Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are taking their distance from the United States in exasperation at its efforts to line them up behind the Israeli-Egyptian "separate peace," when all other Gulf states are saying--as Kuwait did yesterday--that if anyone is likely to be invading their oilfields, it is the United States, and when the Iraqi Ba'thists' would-be union partners, the Syrian Ba'thists, are trying to cultivate Soviet support as a counterweight to the American-Israeli-Egyptian axis.

In a speech distributed by the Iraqi News Agency, Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti said: "We must take up arms against any foreigner, regardless of his colour, who may violate (Arab) sovereignty. In this context we do not differentiate between a progressive, a Zionist, or a Frenchman. Nor do we differentiate between American and Soviet. Irrespective of the formal friendly ties it may have with some of us, the Soviet Union--and it is a friend of Iraq--cannot be allowed to occupy Saudi territory. This is because Saudi land is not outside the Arab map, and what applies to it applies to the rest of the Arab countries."

It is the boldest hint Iraq has yet made in its campaign to display itself as a stoutly anti-communist regime. Whatever Saddam Husayn may say, anti-communism cannot be wholly divorced from anti-Sovietism. His message is clearly intended for American as well as Saudi ears, coming as it does after many other signs, such as moderation on oil prices and an ordour to do business with American companies, that Iraq would like the Americans to distinguish between its ostensible radicalism and its actual pragmatism.

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It is not farfetched to suggest, as the Ba'thists' critics do, that, after the revolution in Iran the Ba'thists are aiming to present themselves, if not exactly as America's gendarme in the Gulf, at least as a guarantor of its stability along with the Saudis.

The problem for the Iraqis however, is that, in offering their candidature for this role, they are reduced to something bordering on schizophrenia. They have to protect their "progressive" flanks and they seem to be achieving this, verbally at least, less by their faltering union with Syria than by their new approaches to the Palestinians. They have now earned a certificate of good conduct from the PLO which given Yasir 'Arafat's excellent relations with Ayatollah Khomeyni, they must value.

A few months ago, the PLO was denouncing Saddam Husayn as a terrorist indistinguishable from Mr Begin, but before the recent Baghdad conference a joint Iraqi-Palestinian declaration called for "a complete severance of relations with the United States and the use of the oil weapon against it."

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MAURITANIA

BOUCEIF PREPARED FOR WAR BUT HOPES IT WILL NOT HAPPEN

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 Apr 79 p 15 LD

[Report by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "United Atmosphere in Mauritania"]

[Text] The reception rooms of former ministers under President Mokhtar Ould Daddah or Abdelaziz Saal, former National Assembly chairman, have been constantly crowded since they were released Friday 13 April after 9 months imprisonment.

There has been a constant stream of visitors, including current ministers, with embraces and moving meetings. For a few days they have become the stars of the country's news. But the real victor is Ahmed Ould Bouceif, the new prime minister, who has succeeded in creating a new united atmosphere around himself after a period of chaos.

To mark the change, Ahmed Ould Bouceif has chosen to attack "the old regime, in other words current President Moustafa Ould Saleck's regime," accusing it of having, in its turn, led the country into "total confusion" and having revived "the demons of former divisions."

"I have nothing to do with the previous team," Bouceif told me in a tiny office furtively prepared in the presidency just 20 meters from the presidential office. However real power no longer lies in that presidential office where Moustafa Ould Saleck replaced Mokhtar Ould Daddah 10 July 1978.

However the program drawn up by Ahmed Ould Bouceif and his main comrades in arms such as Lieutenant Colonels Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, Mohamed Ba Ould Abdelkader, better known as "Kader," Khouma Ould Hidallah or Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, for moving toward peace is bound to meet with internal and external opposition.

Certain young people close to the Polisario are denouncing the attempt to patch up the "Rabat-Nouackchott-Dakar" axis. And the Polisario itself, in a statement issued Sunday 15 April, announced that the withdrawal of Moroccans and Mauritians from Saharan territory is a precondition to any negotiation.

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That stance does not worry Ahmed Ould Bouceif too much. He considers it extremely "illogical." It cannot be a definitive answer. Is Mauritania prepared for a possible resumption of the war? "If we are pushed too far and not left any choice then we are prepared," Bouceif said in a determined way while hoping that the need would not arise....

By meeting Leopold Sedar Senghor on 9 April Bouceif secured a respite in the ethnic quarrel between white and black Mauritians on his southern flank.

It remains to be seen whether the new Mauritania, which has emerged from the third change in government in 2 months, is capable of meeting the challenge.

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MAURITANIA

OULD AMAR SAID TO BE RELAUNCHING POLITICAL DEBATE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 pp 17, 18

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani, "The Paving-Bloc of Ismail Ould Amar"]

[Text] "I intend to form a political party as soon as general conditions ensuring freedom of expression, assembly, and political associations are created". This communique presented on 15 March to the international press by Mr Ismail Ould Amar, former student of the Central School (France), and former President Director-General of the National Mining and Industrial Company (SNIM), had a certain effect in Mauritania.

On the eve of the coup d'etat of 10 July 1978 against Mokhtar Ould Daddah, Mr Ould Amar was one of the first to lend his support to the Military Committee of the National Revival. His motives then seemed to be economic. Actually, under the former regime, the Polisario was furiously attacking Mauritania in the "war of the Sahara", and particularly the mining sector of Zouerate. But the SNIM, which Mr Ould Amar directed, controlled the extraction and exportation of iron, the main asset of Mauritania. And the survival of this sector depends on the extension of the Guelbs project.

But the "dynamic of peace" preached by the Mauritanian military men did not move the neighboring countries, Morocco and Algeria, the economy is still in the swamp, and the two main communities of Mauritania are in open conflict. It is in this context that the former strongman, known for his abilities as an economist and manager, substitutes himself for the politicians (President Mokhtar Ould Daddah and all of his ministers are still under arrest). He takes at their word the military men, who promised on 10 July to encourage the return to democratic norms and even to multiparty activity.

Ismail Ould Amar announces the color: "Mauritania should opt in internal, economic, and foreign policy for the path which its religious and liberal traditions recommended for it." That did not fail to intrigue more than one person and reassured a large part of Mauritanian opinion which would like to see Mauritania return to what it was before "the exclusive relations" with Algeria of the years 1972-1974, before the nationalization

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of the iron and the conflict in the Sahara. It is this imbalance, with the enormous burden of the war, which has destabilized the country, without mentioning the long and terrible drought.

Nevertheless it was the nationalization of the iron (mined by the MIFERMA) on 28 November 1974 which made use of the great management abilities of Ismail Ould Amar. On the eve of this nationalization everyone believed that the former MIFERMA, 95 percent of the key employees of which were foreigners, would collapse. He succeeded in gaining mastery over "the monster", known until recently as a "state within the state". His stubbornness, his sense of organization, his American manager style, and his exceptional capacity for work gained him much respect and also much animosity among his compatriots. He upset the rhythm of their lives. Only President Mokhtar Ould Daddah supported him against many key employees, including certain ministers...Several weeks after the coup d'etat, Ismail Ould Amar understood the quality of this support. He resigned from the management of the SNIM last January.

Since then he has joined the national reconciliation, he has pleaded for the release of all the political prisoners and for the restoration of the national community with the least racial prejudice. For him, only "democracy and essential freedoms" can save the country from gradual exhaustion. His idea of reviving political debate in a country obsessed by the war arouses the hope that Mauritania can once again find the equilibrium it needs to settle its own problems.

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MOROCCO

MOROCCAN CITRUS EXPORTS INCREASING

London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Mar 79 p 101

[Text]

Last year brought a bumper citrus harvest for Morocco, with production soaring by 33% to a record level of 1,070,000 tonnes, compared with only 802,000 tonnes the season before that. Now it looks as though this year's crop will be in the same range as last year's.

This spectacular rise over the past three years is of primary importance for the faltering Moroccan economy as citrus fruit is the country's biggest export item after phosphates. Export projections for the current season are 685,000 tonnes, representing an increase of 16,000 tonnes over last year's levels. And, for the first time, the market for Moroccan citrus is opening up in the Middle East.

The major cause of both the decline between 1973 and 1975 and the swift recovery achieved in the three subsequent years was apparently the policy of the OCE, the Moroccan state export office. This programme favoured grafting of new seedless citrus strains while seed-bearing trees were being cut.

The coming into production of new generations of seedless clementine trees, combined with good weather until the autumn, contributed substantially to the abundant harvest. Although oranges constitute 75% of citrus production, the clementine crop is increasing rapidly. It doubled

in the past two seasons and clementine exports this year are expected to reach 183,000 tonnes - a rise of nearly 11.6% over the previous year.

Clementines are being promoted for a variety of reasons. The small, brightly-coloured fruit is highly decorative and easy to peel. The clementine is sweeter than most varieties of orange, its pulp is juicy and its fragrance agreeable. Most important, it can be picked earlier than other fruits, thus lengthening the citrus season. Since the clementine ripens slowly, it may be shipped great distances without spoiling.

Some 62% of the total crop last season went to countries in Western Europe, but the USSR remains the biggest single importer, taking up to 200,000 tonnes annually as part of a bilateral barter agreement. Moroccans find exporting to Western Europe somewhat chancy, as European importers require top quality. Moreover, the keen competition from other Mediterranean producers will undoubtedly heighten when Spain and Greece, both citrus producers, join the European Economic Community (EEC) (see *The Middle East*, No 51, page 111).

This is why deals with new customers are significant. Discussing this year's marketing abroad, OCE Director-General

Abdullah Lahlou says: "The contracts recently won by Morocco in the East really stand out when one takes into account the vast tonnages which are exported by other Mediterranean countries." Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, along with Poland, have placed new orders for Moroccan citrus, the first such contracts made with Middle East countries.

Exports are also being bolstered in 1979 by the addition of a new freighter, the SS *Souss*, to the Moroccan fleet of 35 fruit ships. Government economists intend to save foreign currency and reduce freight costs by increasing the proportion of fruit shipped in Moroccan freighters.

Moroccan domestic consumption of citrus fruit is surprisingly low in comparison with other citrus-producing countries like Spain and the US. In fact only one fifth of the crop is consumed in Morocco - an amount equivalent to under 8.9kg a head. The potential for internal sales is great and will be exploited by a full-scale advertising campaign on radio, television and in the press, stressing the benefits to health of eating citrus fruit.

One problem, however, is that Moroccan growers have discovered that, despite increases in fruit prices, production costs tend to absorb all profit. Government bonuses, paid for

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larger sizes of fruit, redder skins and early production, have failed to offset soaring costs. For this reason ASPAM, the Moroccan citrus growers' association, has asked the Government to take a series of mitigating measures.

These would include the abolition or reduction of import duties on agricultural implements, spare parts and pesticides and a reduction in fuel and fertiliser prices for citrus growers. In addition the growers are recommending the

study of the possibility of a "Green Dirham", a preferential exchange rate applicable to citrus exports to Europe, similar to special dirham rates granted to Moroccans working in the EEC. Development of port facilities at Nador, due to become operational this year, should likewise facilitate citrus shipments from the interior.

If the Moroccan Government can meet these demands, citrus farmers, along with economists, may have reason to smile over soaring figures for production and export.

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MOROCCO

BRIEFS

AMF LOAN--Morocco is to get a \$7.25mn loan from the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) to help to cover its trade deficit. The three-year loan, which will carry an initial interest rate of 3.75% rising to 4.25% and then 4.75% is the fourth to have been granted by the Abu Dhabi-based AMF. Other loans to Egypt, Sudan and Mauritania bring the Fund's total lending so far to \$35mn. [Text] [London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Mar 79 p 114]

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PERSIAN GULF AREA

IRANIAN REVOLUTION SAID TO JEOPARDIZE OMANI SECURITY, U.S. BASES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 16-22 Feb 79 pp 22-25

[Article: "America Strengthens Its Electronic Presence in Turkey and the Gulf"]

[Text] Mr Qais Al-Zawawi, foreign affairs minister in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, is conducting a series of visits to states in the area, with special instructions from Sultan Qabus. Informed sources told the correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the purpose of Al-Zawawi's visits is to justify the Sultanate's inclination towards contracting a mutual defense pact with the United States, in which American military organizations would take the place of the Iranian military organizations in the Sultanate of Oman.

This justification is based on the change that has occurred in Iran, which is leading to the decline of the Iranian military role in supporting the defense forces of the Sultanate, which could encourage "the destructive elements" to resume their activity in the Dhofar region, in such a way that would threaten the security of the petroleum supply lines of the Gulf, especially in the Harmuz straits.

The government of Muscat bases its fears on reports which spoke of the beginning of secret movements in Dhofar Province, and of an active movement across the borders with South Yemen. Linked with this renewed activity are attacks aimed in the past year at a group of British technical advisors on the coast of Dhofar.

It is known that there are two squadrons of helicopters belonging to the weapons of Iranian Air, which are stationed with their crews in the Sultanate, in addition to four new reconnaissance planes, which were until recently carrying out exploratory flights in the sky over neighboring states. Informed circles said that the likelihood of the decline of the Iranian military role had stimulated a special interest in the United States in strengthening the defense forces of the Sultanate of Oman, at the same time as they strengthen the defense forces of North Yemen, in such a way that it would place South Yemen in a strategic "nutcracker," which would prevent Soviet influence from spreading from there.

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The truth is that military discussions between Washington and Oman began as soon as the shah left Iran, and they continue, apart from the mission of American Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in the region. Informed sources said, concerning the procedure of these discussions, that follow-up consultations are being carried out with Egypt, on the basis that the United States prefers not to have a direct military presence in the Sultanate of Oman, in order to avoid the feelings and reaction that would provoke, and on the basis that Egypt can take the place of Iran in the Sultanate of Oman. These sources mentioned that President Sadat was enthusiastic about the idea, and is considering sending a squadron of artillery and two squadrons of paratroopers to Oman with a large number of officers who previously served in Yemen, and have had experience with guerrilla warfare.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI understood from informed circles that the last visit of Qais al-Zawawi to Jidda and his meeting with Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal was to inform Saudi Arabia of the possibilities, and to consult them concerning the question of seeking assistance from Egyptian forces. It is said in this respect that the Sultanate of Oman, in order to maintain "balance," asked for help from Jordanian forces in addition to the Egyptian forces. For this reason, it is possible that Mr Qais al-Zawawi will visit Amman in the near future, in preparation for a secondary meeting between King Hussein and Sultan Qabus, in order to study the subject. It is understood that the Sultanate of Oman is attempting to obtain finances to provide for the expenses of any Egyptian or Jordanian forces which come to settle in place of the Iranian forces. The communications between the Sultanate and Cairo arrived at a basic agreement that Egyptian forces will ask for finances in a security situation. The subject has been studied with the American authorities, which preferred to wait for some time until the Iranian incidents and developments crystallize in final form, and until, in light of that, the final touches are completed in the plan, to fill in the gaps which have been caused by the Iranian developments in the organization of American observation stations.

Nevertheless, the recent clashes between Iranian military units loyal to the shah and those loyal to Khomeyni have led to an increase in the fear of the American leadership that a number of modern, secret observation installations will fall into the hands of Soviet agents during the turmoil, though those clashes remain limited in scope, and may be contained by the Iranian Army commanders through an immediate agreement that would protect Iran from the danger of a real civil war. Therefore, orders have been issued to disassemble the rest of the observation stations and early warning stations which were set up by the weapons of American engineering. The dismemberment of the chief station was begun immediately following the departure of the shah. This station, with its supporting stations, records what is called the "Ibex" organization, which operates along 2000 kilometers of the Iranian-Soviet border, and is connected with similar organizations in Alaska, Canada, Japan and Thailand, in addition to the American bases in Turkey. Experts say that the closing of the American stations in Iran opens a gap in the power or American intelligence, a deficiency which cannot be filled by means of spy satellites.

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It is known that the Ibex stations had two functions: the first relies on strong radar apparatus to discover movements and mobilizations, for the security of early warning of any surprise attack. The second follows experiments carried out by the Soviet Union to develop its satellites, spaceships and nuclear weapons, and picks up and records signals and communications between Soviet units, and attempts to decipher their code.

It was revealed, in this connection, that the American organizations of the observation and spy stations are under the custody of Dr Aaron, the chief advisor for national security, and one of the most important assistants of the first advisor, Dr Brzezinski. In that capacity, he is undertaking a study of the distribution of the apparatuses and installations after their dismemberment in Iran, among all the American bases in Turkey and the bases which are being negotiated in the Sultanate of Oman.

There were reports from some Arab diplomatic sources that a number of American intelligence agents who had been working in Iran have begun to take up residence, under the pretext of commercial work and economic activity, in numerous spots of the Gulf, especially in Dubayy, taking advantage of the freedom to work in any free trade zone. These reports indicate that the intelligence agency may set up its new chief center in Dubayy, under the pretext of an institution for economic and development studies, avoiding anything that might attract attention.

In spite of the importance of the bases which will be set up in the Sultanate of Oman, their activity will be mixed, and will never be able to cover anything except a tiny part of the Soviet Union, though it will cover chiefly the Gulf area and the Red Sea straits, and the hills of the Horn of Africa. Likewise, the real functions of observation will be transferred to the American bases in Turkey, and these functions will be distributed between observation of the Soviet borders, toward the middle Soviet region, and observing the neighboring area along the southeast borders of Turkey, which contain Iraq, Syria and Iran. It is clear from the information of diplomatic observers in Ankara that the project of the new Turkish-American bases aims particularly at operating and consolidating two pivotal bases, namely the Sinop base on the Black Sea and the Bir Angelique base in Diyar Bakr (southeast Turkey). The arrangements require the Diyar Bakr base to concentrate its activity on observing Soviet activity in the field of rockets and spaceships, especially in the middle and southern Soviet republics. This base will be directly linked with the American naval observation base in New Jersey in the United States. Because of these arrangements, it is reported that the security agency of the American Army will administer the Sinop base on the Black Sea.

In anticipation of the completion of the new arrangements in the Sultanate of Oman and in Turkey, the latest reports from Washington have informed that there is an orientation toward concentrating the activity of American satellites above the region of the Iranian-Soviet border.

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TUNISIA

'JEUNE AFRIQUE' VIEWS SYMPTOMS OF MUSLIM REVIVAL

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 pp 82-84 LD

[Report by Souhayr Belhassen: "Islamic Challenge in Tunisia"]

[Text] In the working class quarter of El Khadra (near the industrial area of Tunis) a wedding is taking place. Surprise! No one in the district is aware of the event. Neither the old, nor the young nor even the children....

A group of men chat quietly in front of a house. There is no excitement, no yu-yu [traditional Arab song of joy at weddings]. Is it a wedding or a funeral?...

Yet the groom is the local grocer, a man of means who could easily afford a noisy wedding.... But the grocer is marrying according to Koranic principles. He is surrounded by about 30 men, his friends and relatives, who are taking part in this ceremony "recommended by God," but which must remain simple.

In the cool dusk, under the fragrant orange tree, rugs have been laid out. Around the groom, dressed in a suit and European-style necktie, his friends, sitting crosslegged, break into liturgical chants. A young man serves orgeat syrup as they wait for the dish of couscous to arrive. When the dish is empty everything will be over and the groom will be able to go meet his wife....

On the women's side the simplicity is even more surprising, especially when it is displayed in a prosperous setting.

Another wedding, between a lawyer and a student this time.... The bride, dressed in a kaftan, wears a garment which falls to her shoulders. No jewelry; the only decoration is a flower pinned to her temple.... No makeup either, her lips are barely pink. A large number of veiled women surround her, chatting, joking and, here too, singing liturgical chants. Cakes are handed round, but no one thinks of singing nonreligious songs. Nor is there any question of belly dancing!

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When the groom is announced, without the customary hooting horns, only close relatives are left, among them an amateur photographer, the sole concession to "modernism."

The Islamic revival is an ideology, men, a movement, but also a way of life.

In the Tunisia of tolerance, easy living and tourism, a parallel society is emerging, developing and becoming organized. It has its laws and its rules. Its members refuse to speak French and will not shake hands with a woman. It is obviously out of the question for women to appear in public.

Thus, the two "Muslim" theatrical troupes, who only perform in private, are exclusively male. The one at Bab el Djazira performs two plays, "The City of Slaves" and "Robayechia," in which the action revolves around Islam's response to worker exploitation.

There are many groups of musicians. They are male or female but never mixed. Their repertoire consists of liturgical chants, but also songs exalting Islamic zeal.

This austerity sometimes shocks certain young people who, despite their commitment, would prefer a more modern form of Islam. M'Hamed, aged 21, is manager of one of the 42 "Islamic" sports teams. Like the Muslim scout groups the sports teams, chiefly soccer clubs, are generally under the control of the local Mosque. The aim of the matches held at the local stadium, M'Hamed explains, is not so much competitive sport itself as a means of proving to young people that Islam is not grim and forbidding. The players' shorts come down to their knees and, as Islam dictates, blows and insults are prohibited.

Perched on a racing bicycle M'Hamed, who works as a sales assistant in a bookshop for 50 dinars a month, claims that since he has been with his "borthers" he feels he is leading a useful life but, he says, "in my view Islam should not be sad. Because I am happy to be involved with them, I sometimes want to sing and dance about it. Yet Islam forbids this!"

Together with Islamic sporting pursuits there are of course intellectual activities.

The movement has its own literary premises: In a working class quarter of Tunis the Arraya (Flag) Bookshop and Publishing House publishes some 100 titles and offers nearly 2,000 works for sale. The publications have the austere appearance of Soviet or Chinese propaganda brochures.

The best sellers reach sales of 10,000-15,000 copies and include works by Egyptian authors (Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his disciple Sayyid Qutub) and works by Pakistani poet Mohamed Iqbal. The movement's magazine AL-MA'RIFAH (KNOWLEDGE) prints 5,000 copies but that low distribution level is compensated by the success of the cassettes,

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"the new weapon of the century," as one of the leaders said. A small dealer in the medina claims he sells 500 cassettes per month of recordings made in Tunis of sermons by Egyptian Sheikh 'abd-al-Hamid Kishk.

As far as organization is concerned, there is also a study and information group (to be exact, an "information-seeking" group). This group has the task of promoting publications favorable to the cause or pronouncing unfavorable ones anathema. It is this group which is responsible for the "wall newspapers" (to be seen mainly in the mosques) and small posters. On the walls of the downtown Charles de Gaulle pedestrian street you can read: "Prayer is a pillar of Islam."

"At primary school my teacher encouraged me to play," said Ahmed, a 16-year-old boy, "then I stopped for a few years. Some 3 years ago I met the 'messengers' who always go round in a group of three. There is al-Amir (the prince), al-Dalil (the guide) and al-Khatib (the speaker-propagandist). They invited me to attend the 'lessons' they give at the 20 March Mosque in the Bardo (inner suburb of Tunis) and it is only after 4 months spent in complete isolation with other brothers in another mosque, reading and understanding the Koran that I have become a propagandist myself." Ali has an afro hairstyle, black jacket, tee-shirt, jeans and clogs and still has no beard, although he is allowing what there is of his beard to grow: "I attend classes since there is nothing else to do and no roundups are carried out there."

His 24-year-old "brother" Mohsen said he is sickened by the deterioration of morals, films and women who walk around virtually naked.... He is a worker but opposes strikes. "I always manage to reach an understanding with my boss who is a committed Islamic militant."

Certain public and private enterprises are ostentatiously encouraging this return to the faith. One polytechnic graduate, managing director of one of the biggest state companies, inaugurated his appointment with a Koran reading ceremony in his office.

It is not unusual to find somebody praying in a minister's anteroom. The army barracks are one of the movement's (recent) fields of action. However, there is nothing to equal the teachers' force of persuasion. One mother having leftwing political leanings was always anxious to send her children to a state school. "This year I was forced to send my eldest daughter to a different school. Last year they were taken to collective lessons in a mosque every Friday afternoon...." Another mother said that her son (12 years old) forbids her to watch French television programs and forces her to wear long skirts. "It is in school that we must prepare the Islamic society of the future," one teacher told me.

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TUNISIA

'JEUNE AFRIQUE' CONTINUES REPORT ON MUSLIM REVIVAL

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Mar 79 pp 65-69 LD

[Part two of report by Souhayr Belhassen: "Islamic Dissent in Tunisia"]

[Text] Tunis, 10 Nov 78--Rain is pouring down and the city has become a mere blurred landscape. The day is just beginning. Unusual activities are beginning in Belvadere gardens, in the city's northern district. People are arriving from all directions and are gradually forming groups on the lawn--100, 200, 300...more and more. The groups are becoming a dense crowd standing under umbrellas which together form a protective black canopy.

"Allah Akbar," "Allah Akbar" (God is greatest)--for 15 or 20 minutes, voices invoke God's name as one of the many police cars which have watched approaches to the park draws nearer to the crowd closely followed by a Renault 4L automobile.

The man who alights from it is young--about 30. He is immediately hoisted on to some shoulders. In the presence of the police officer who does not leave him, he addresses the crowd: "Allah Akbar." "We have not gathered here with a view to any confrontation," he says, "but to say the 'Id al-Adha (feast day marking the conclusion of the pilgrimage to Mecca) prayer. Law enforcement officers are our brothers. We must help them to maintain order. If we are told where we can find a mosque which is open, we will go there. ..." The crowd scatters among the park's lanes but as soon as the group surrounding the man who has just spoken leaves the gardens, police units intervene. A general melee ensues. Most of the demonstrators are arrested.

At the very same time, similar, though less spectacular scenes are being enacted in the market square, behind the radio building, in the new residential El Menzah district, in city suburbs, and in Ariana and Bardo districts where the faithful have occupied the mosque....

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"We Believe that the Term 'Muslim' is Inappropriate"

For the first time since independence was achieved, the faithful demonstrate in the streets to protest against the closing of mosques on 'Id Day according to the Hegira calendar.

This demonstration can be traced back to an ideology, some men and a movement. People called "khouanjias," a neologism meaning "brother-like" ["freristes"] with reference to the Muslim brothers in Egypt who incidently object to this name. "We believe that the term 'brother' must not lead to any misunderstanding," a leader of the movement stated. "We are all brothers inasmuch as we are members of the same community. We reject any political connotation." One of the principal leaders of the Islamic revival movement (a term on which everybody seems to agree) explained: "We do not recognize ourselves under the designation 'Muslim brothers' which has been conferred on us by the Destourian Socialist Party for counterpropaganda purposes. Furthermore, we believe that the term 'Muslim' is not quite right. We contrast it with the term 'Islamic,' meaning that it is not enough to pray five times a day and to fast to be worthy of Islam.... Islam is tantamount to 'militancy.'"

Active members of the movement, especially leaders, do not refuse to explain what they mean nor to discuss matters. On the contrary, they give the impression that the combatants of this new "Jihad" (holy war) have only one objective--to spread. They lose no opportunity to make themselves known.

Asked about the origin of their movement, the integrists mention 1970 and explain it mainly in terms of the "1969 crisis." In 1969, the Tunisian Government put a stop to a policy of extending cooperatives, which was advocated by Minister Ahmed Ben Salah, and gradually embarked on the path of a liberal economy. As far as the integrists were concerned, this crisis was not only an economic crisis but also a crisis of society. "It was natural," that say, "that we should have seen ourselves as an alternative. Our solution has the following advantage: It has its roots in our civilization, culture and religion." During the "pause for reflection" in 1970-1971, which marked the end of cooperativization, many "liberal" and "progressive" Tunisians first played a role and then were dispensed with.

Organized at University

Only the integrist movement emerged strengthened from this transitional period. For instance, in 1970, the association for the safeguarding of the Koran--a legal but watered down expression of a movement long in decline and officially belonging to the cultural sphere--gained strength.

A movement for the safeguarding and propagation of Islam, whose members were young students both from the Ez-Zitouna faculty of theology and the faculty of law, took shape and was organized at the university. The

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present leaders of the movement were at that time either teachers or students, with the exception of sheikh Mohamed Salah Neifer, a moderate element in a movement which has its "reactionaries" and its "extremists."

Historical Figure of Integrism

The 75-year-old sheikh left Tunisia for Algeria in 1960 when President Bourguiba, who saw the battle against underdevelopment in terms of a "jihad" of modern times, declared that there was no need to fast during the sacred Ramadan month.

Despite the political aspects of his opposition, Sheikh Neifer shares the belief of certain "fuquaha" (jurists) of classical times that fight from secular responsibilities was proof of purity and independence. Indeed, he still believes that it is the duty of religious leaders to exercise a moral censorship over the state, not to assume power. "In any case," he recalls, "former Algerian leader Farhat Abbas told me: 'It is in your interest to have a secular state since this will insure that the state does not gain control over religious affairs under the pretext that it is Muslim.'"

Sheikh Neifer assesses realistically the role of the movement in society. For instance, he does not oppose participation in the government's activities insofar as state policy can be oriented in a direction more consistent with Islam. However, he adds, our main role in the opposition is to insure that certain liberties, especially freedom of worship, are restored.

A fierce denouncer of corruption and immorality, the venerable sheikh, whose wife joins in the conversation and whose daughter serves tea wearing tight fitting slacks and a tee shirt, recalls that he has created the first school for "Muslim girls" because women are "at the basis of any just society." Therefore, they must be given instruments of knowledge "even though steps must be taken to insure that they do not become agents of deterioration in morals."

While Sheikh Neifer is a historical figure of integrism, Abdelfateh Moro is the best known leader of the movement. "Sheikh Moro," as he is called by his followers, brings to mind both Jesuits and cabaret singers. His manners, style and behavior in private are reminiscent of the former. He dislikes neither good food nor good company. His plump figure, his immaculate "jebba," his turban and his beard cut in a style favored by the "brothers" make him physically reassuring for the older generations. His age (35) and his profession (lawyer) enable him to move in various circles. He maintains relations both at home--with business circles and political movements (he was one of the lawyers who represented former trade unionists at their trial)--and abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia which he visits regularly. He was one of the first people who established links between university and mosque.

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Islam Means Effort and Struggle

A good talker, his popularity stems from his criticisms, often humorous, of the government. As imam of the Bey M'Hammed Mosque in Halfaouine, a working class suburb of Tunis, he was the life and soul of that district during the August 1978 Ramadan nights. In his most popular sermons, he discusses all subjects, including international and national events, and criticizes both the information media and the authorities. His straightforward, even simplistic approach smacks of paternalism. A legend grew up around Sheikh Moro following the 26 January events--it is said that he was struck by a bullet during the riots but that the bullet was stopped by a small Koran which he carried in the left side pocket of his waistcoat. A miracle!

Forty-year-old theology professor Rached al-Ghanouchi is endowed with a prudence and effectiveness of an apparatchik. At Sidi Youssef Mosque in the Tunis Kasbah, he explains that Islam means effort, struggle--"Iran's example proves this," he says, the time for awakening has come--let us fight against any slovenliness, austerity and effort should inspire us. It is because he set an example that the prophet was able to demand so many sacrifices from others. In order to improve others and carry out our revolution, we must first improve ourselves and worship God. If neither leftist nor rightist revolutions have succeeded, it is because man has not carried out his own revolution.... He has always yielded to temptation. Muslim believers derive their spirit of sacrifice, which will enable them to create a better future, from strength derived from their faith. They harbor powerful elements of progress a tireless militant, Rached al-Ghanouchi does not aspire to leadership. Everywhere he provides answers consistent with Islamic integritism to questions any member of the community can ask.

Hassen Ghodbani, who recruits followers from among Sheikh Moro's supporters, the movement's youngest and most radical leader.

In the heart of a densely populated area of the Medina, the Sidi Mehrez Mosque is crowded with people thronging into the great hall and courtyard and even onto the steps.... Almost 1,000 people are listening religiously to the preacher. Hassen Ghodbani in no way resembles the beturbanned old man to whom age and experience generally assign this role. His appearance is rather that of a student vigorously haranguing the crowd of the faithful. His voice is young and strong, his language vernacular. It is not the language of the Koran, but rather of the tribunes. "We say to those who oppose us that to confront us is to fight against God!"

God the Only Judge

"Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar," the crowd shouts repeatedly: "Allahu Akbar," comes the echo reverberating from the imposing vaults and marble columns.

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He is 26--"I must wait another 14 years," he says, "until I can stand as a candidate for the presidency of the republic"--a graduate in law, and a partner in former Justice Minister Bellalounna's chambers. Hassen Ghodbani believes that God is the only judge of his actions. "If God were not with me, I would not do what I am doing. The leaders know this. That is why I can express myself freely. Every Sunday hundreds of cassettes of my speeches are recorded."

Combating Marxism

This young man's aggressive assurance stems from the fact that at least once a week men and women of all ages and conditions come to the mosque to hear his sermons, to hear them again and to record them. With his turn-over collar and tortoise-shell glasses, this cantor of the "new Islam" was formerly a convinced Marxist and has visited the Soviet Union. "It matters little," he says, "that I was in an organized movement and had contacts with the embassy, because I have renounced Marxism, by the grace of God." So it is with the faith of the proselyte studying in the law faculty that he addresses meetings, to virulently attack communists and atheism. Hassen Ghodbani knows Marxism from the inside, so to speak. He maintains that he can confront it more easily. So it is through the "circles" of the Islamic movement both in the faculty and on the campus (where he is imam of the chapel) that Hassen Ghodbani makes himself known. A Pakistani brotherhood, whose mission is to spread Islam, contacts him. Together, they travel to Europe. According to Ghodbani, with the aim of spreading the good word, but, according to his detractors, to assimilate propaganda methods.

Efficient, enterprising and clever, he is gaining followers and a stature that are threatening to eclipse his predecessors in this movement.

According to his followers, the reason why he is now recognized as a leader is that he is "the strongest Muslim militant." He can speak for 2 hours without notes on any subject and is not afraid of openly attacking specific national leaders.

Many people accuse him of inflexibility. He scarcely bothers to deny it: "I cannot shake hands with a non-Muslim but I never refuse dialog." Ghodbani, who had former foreign minister Mohamed Masmoudi as a witness at his wedding, states that "a person's past does not interest me." "Masmoudi is a good Muslim," he adds.

These new Muslim leaders do not deliver sermons. They "give lectures." As imams they do not need pamphlets or watchwords to assemble their supporters. God calls his faithful on specific days at fixed times and in a previously appointed place: The mosque. The imam, who might be a simple believer, delivers his sermon. That type of immunity gives rise to veritable meetings, especially during Friday prayers between 1300 and 1500 hours and evening prayers. The congregation is generally made up of

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young people; the majority are about 20 years old and they record any lesson on cassettes. The tone is that of a political speech, generally critical of the government and social inequalities.

The subversive tone surprises the oldest men and women and provides them with a topic of conversation; it has a mobilizing effect on the young who are attracted by this freedom of speech and above all by a marked need for identification and authenticity.

Following the five daily prayers and sheltered by places of prayer, they learn to know and especially to recognize their fellows. The mosques are more numerous than the cells of any political group and they are also a "church" with its militants, its supporters and its faithful who believe and hope...

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TUNISIA

'JEUNE AFRIQUE' CONCLUDES SURVEY OF ISLAMIC RENEWAL MOVEMENT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Mar 79 pp 89-92 LD

[Part three of article by Souhayr Belhassen: "Dissident Islam in Tunisia"]

[Text] The Islamic renewal movement leaders in Tunisia are as vague as they are verbose when defining the running of a society completely controlled by religion. But amid the general incoherence, the statements made by some reveal the new currents stirring in Islamic thought. Should they or should they not accede to power? How? Should they reject al-Qadhdhafi and the Saudis, Marxism and the West, democracy and thranny all at the same time? Those are questions which they have no hesitation in answering and which show an important evolution in the movement.

The Muslim integrists have a unitary view of the world inspired by the Koranic principle: "Everything in heaven and on earth belongs to God." That rules out any distinction between secular and sacred and between juridical and religious. Dogma and law are one. The Koran is God's message but also a rule of life. Hassen Ghodbani, a young imam from one of the city's most important mosques, Sidi Mehrez, said "Islam is our ideological foundation, our end and our means." "The Western notion of political organization cannot be applied to us," another imam said during a sermon. The idea of national unity built around Bourguiba is attacked by the new preachers: "We reject the separation between state and religion. We oppose Bourguiba's claim to be the greatest. No man is greater than another, only God." "God is great!" The speaker exclaimed, "God is great" the crowd replied. While the regime's social doctrine is based on the concept of national unity to combat the Marxist idea of class struggle, the new Islamic theoreticians stress the importance, in the people's minds, of the link between Islam and the unitary national ideology.

Real National Debate

During their classes, the most highly politicized among them readily exploit that idea, turning the slogan against the government and accusing it of cutting the idea off from its very essence which is Islam.

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For example, some of the government's achievements, regarded by the integrists as "gains"--particularly the cooperatives or education--were doomed to failure because, according to them, they were not based on an ideological foundation, in this case Islam. A theology professor who is a leader of the movement explained: "Our school programs are not based on our Islamic heritage, they are simply imitations of programs designed with an eye to the West."

Slaheddine Jouchi, chief editor of the magazine AL-MA'RIFAH, has the age, manner and dress of a student and during religious discussions at a mosque in Halfaouine, an ordinary people's district in Tunis, expounds the movements theories. His demands are, curiously enough, part of what the political parties want to make the subject of a real national debate: Namely the future of freedom and democracy in the country.

For example, when questioned on the young integrists' program he replied: "Asking us to talk about our program poses a false problem. We are demanding a free environment. Then we could put forward proposals and compare them to others." "However," he added, "although the principle of freedom is a constant in Islam, its application can vary."

On that question and on many others, two trends can be distinguished within the movement which come together on priority objectives, which are essentially ideological. "Ours is a social, educational and cultural movement," one of the movement's theoreticians stated. "We are trying to take this society back to its deep-seated roots and to promote a flourishing Islamic culture. If we transform the basis of society, in other words the young men and women of our society, and spread Islam to found an Islamic society, politics and economics will follow."

"Western-style Democracy"

One group, represented by lawyer Sheikh Abdelfateh Moro, does not regard politics as a determining force. "We will support an experiment in Western-style democracy because it would benefit us and would enable us to put theory into practice in that it would give different groups the opportunity to express their views. However, what is unusual about us is that we are in no hurry. We do not want power. We know that as long as a society is illegitimate and until it returns to what constitutes its ideological foundation, any political experiment is doomed to failure."

Islam is Multidimensional

Another group, more recent, more politicized and more radical, which is represented by the other jurist Hassen Ghodbani, rejects any Western-style compromise. "Democracy is government by the people," he said, "the prophet did not govern on his own account or by consulting the people but by following the Koran--the word of God." "God is God of heaven and earth."

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Ghodbani thinks this Koranic precept should be applied to the letter. "The Zitouna sheikhs believe that God is only in heaven and they leave the earth to politicians...that is a false view of Islam. The idea of a multiparty system is also false. Neither the people nor the government are living truly by Islam in Tunisia or elsewhere." The example of Saudi Arabia is irrelevant because, according to the group's theoreticians, the Koran precepts can only be applied if the strategy of the prophet's assumption of power is applied. Therefore, to win power you must first have a popular base as Mohamed did when he went to Medina. However, Ghodbani added an important detail. If an Islamic party were formed he would vote for it because it would be a step toward an Islamic society.

For the integrists the capitalist system and the communist system are "relative" and "incomplete." If capitalism is based on freedom, and communism on justice (but "a justice which sacrifices individual freedom for the benefit of the state"). Islam, like man, is multidimensional. One thing is certain and that is the profound study and absorption of religious values which should provide the integrists with the best weapon in the fight against dialectical materialism. "God created man to submit to nobody but him." The believer's attitude must be based on his faith. "To satisfy God," one imam said, "I must be just." Speaking from his pulpit, Imam Abdelfateh Moro affirmed: "This society is sick and needs care." Asked: "What do you prescribe?", he replied with this outburst: "Do not ask me to solve problems which others have created!" He replied with this outburst: "Do not ask me to solve problems which others have created!" However, he added: "The current problems are due to the nature of the regime."

Although modernity should be welcomed, especially in its scientific and technical aspect, traditionalism and modernism are rejected as ideologies in favor of pure Islam. At this level, there are flagrant imitations from the "Muslim brothers." In trying to get rid of superstructures inherited from non-Islamic social frameworks, the movement includes all fields: Social, economic and political.

The Koran and the Sunnah

The integrists oppose demonstrations of popular piety, particularly the use of magical practices, the cult of saints and the veneration of tombs. "We are against folkloric Islam--the Islam of incense and Benjamin," theology professor Rached Ghanouchi stated. "These rites have given Islam an old-fashioned image, which has enabled Bourguiba to introduce his reforms." "Today that Islam opposes us to the old "turban-wearers" of Zitouna and elsewhere. Under the guise of Muslim orthodoxy they have tried to satisfy their thirst for power by exploiting the Muslim masses' need for holiness which is expressed in the veneration of pious people." In the Muslim religion, Ghanouchi went on "there can be no intercessor between God and men. Allah does not tolerate any partners."

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The integrists, therefore, refer only to the Koran and the Sunnah. That is why al-Qadhdhafi comes under strong attack from the integrists who all say virtually the same on that subject. The Koran lays down union between all Muslims. In that context union with the Libyan people is desired but "union with al-Qadhdhafi's Libya: Never. He is an atheist, an infidel, a communist agent and he denies the prophet," Ghodbani said of him. "He has stated that the green book is his program. We want a union based on the Koran."

The fight which the integrists are waging against the communists is as violent as the one against al-Qadhdhafi. The sermon at the Sidi Mehrez Mosque Sunday, 4 November, lasted 2 hours or more. It was essentially devoted to a pamphlet edited by NOVOSTI which is circulating in Tunis and which says that "the Koran is false and contradictory, is opposed to the people and should not be believed."

The Intelligentsia--An Anti-Islamic Nucleus

"As long as the integrists fight against al-Qadhdhafi and the communists they will have an objective alliance with the government," one professor declared. That "objective alliance" disturbs the progressives and, more generally, the intelligentsia. It is perhaps among them that the anti-Islamic nucleus is strongest. It is composed both of elements belonging to another "chapel" and those who want to liberate a "repressive, backward and religious-type" society. They are almost identical to those who, since independence, have been the pillars of the state spreading the modernist ideal.

The post-independence political class, educated in French universities, adapted perfectly to that option. It was in favor of secularization and even hostile to the Islamism of the old Zitounian ruling class. The adherence to the Western way of life which was at times complete in the new bourgeoisie and their tendency to move away from tradition, accentuates their separation from Islam.

However, "although it is often possible to de-Arabize people it is impossible to de-Islamize them." That remark by a former minister illustrates the fact that, in an opposition and reaction movement, certain politicians who praised Bourguiba's modernist line, are now gaining a new awareness of the Islamic and also Arab foundation of their personality. Hence, some former leaders heed, if not encourage and even help, the growth of this "Islamic revival." The rapprochement between certain politicians--such as former foreign minister Mohamed Masmoudi, who was removed from power--and the new "Islamic" leaders is not without ulterior motives on both sides.

However, both sides have a long way to go before their viewpoints coincide. If those former leaders decided to form a party, Islamism might possibly find political expression.

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A Reversal?

It is as surprising to find such strong Islamic feeling and weak modern Arab feeling among young Islamic militants as it is among the old Zitounian generation. While for the latter Arabism had more of a socio-cultural content tinged with provincialism, for the former the connotation is politicoeconomic and is associated with a sense of failure. In 1978 young people compared Nasir's "glory" with al-Sadat's "treachery." While Arabist ideology was previously to be found beyond Islam it is now within Islam. The diffuse awareness of Islamism is general and strong. It may be capable of turning into enthusiasm or fanaticism.

Are the bold reforms of the Bourguiba era in danger of vanishing with their author? Are we going to see a reversal? At the moment only the party seems vigilant about the development of an integrist movement. The events in Sfax during Ramadan (1977) when integrists supported by the local trade union ransacked a cafe to denounce infidels, prove that the movement is a readily usable force.

The Need for Faith is an Individual Need

The government hesitates to adopt a stance. Former culture minister and current Information Minister Klibi stated: "We are witnessing a return to the faith throughout the world. In Tunisia that trend accords with deep religious and culture roots and it is impossible to oppose this need to return to the faith which is an individual need. However, we cannot accept that the return to the faith should constitute a political and social regression or that it should be manipulated to political ends."

When questioned, most leaders said that the Islamic renewal is a normal swing which cannot be dangerous since it meets a need for free expression.

Government and opposition have the same attitude to the Islamic renewal movement. "If political life were liberalized that movement would take its rightful place and could be regarded as one current among many," they say. Meanwhile the movement is growing.

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